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THE JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES
OVER SEDITIOUS LIBEL.
"Sedition is a comprehensive term, and it embraces all
those practices whether by word, deed, or writing, which
are calculated to disturb the tranquillity of the state, and
lead ignorant persons to endeavor to subvert the government and the laws of the empire."' "All writings, therefore,
which tend to bring into hatred or contempt the Queen, the
Government, or the constitution as by law established, to
promote insurrection, or to encourage the people to resist
the laws, or the administration of justice, are termed seditious libels." 2 These definitions, drawn from an authority
1

Per Fitzgerald,

3.

(afterwards one of the Lords of Appeal in Or-

dinary, appointed under the appellate jurisdiction act, 1876) in his
charge to the jury on the trial of Reg. v. Sullivan and Reg. v. Pigott.

In State Trials (1868); quo,,.d in chapter xxxiii of Folkard's
Law of Slander and Libel (founded upon the treatise of the late
Thomas Starkie, Q. C.) (1897). -This statement is adopted and followed in Reg. v. Burns and others, i6 Cox. C. C 355 (I886), per Cave,
..
This whole chapter of Folkard's treatise is very instructive in conuection with the subject of seditious libel.
'*Folkar 4 Slander aud Libel. chapter xxxiii, p. 638
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on the English law, will serve as at least a tentative definition of what constitutes seditious libel. It is our purpose to
inquire, first, as to the power of the United States to punish
for such libel, and second, as to the extent of that power
if it be found to exist. The questions to which we seek an
answer are: Has the United States power to punish for
seditious libel? What are-the limitations of that power? In
discussing the first question, we shall lay aside from our
consideration the restriction of the first amendnient to the
Constitution of the United States, which provides that
"Congress shall make no law

.

.

.

abridging the

freedom of speech or of the press." The bearing and extent
of this restriction will constitute the second branch of our
inquiry.
In treating of'seditious libels, what is said will, we believe,
in most instances apply to spoken words. Whether the latter
offence is less dangerous to the welfare of the state, and
consequently less deserving of punishment will not affect
the principles which decide the right of the government to
punish for either offence or which determine the extent of
that right.
Whether the United States has power to punish for libels
affecting the stability and permanency of the government
depends, it seems to us, on the principles which decide
whether it has power to guard against forces which tend to
impair the vigor of the nation, or to take from it the elements
which sustain"its life. The relation of seditious libels to the
existence of legal authority is so well stated in Folkard's
treatise that we feel justified in referring again to that
writer . "It is necessarily incident to every permanent form
or system of government to make provision, not merely for
its continuance, but for its secure continuance. To that
security the confidence and esteem of the people is indispensable; and, therefore, it is essential to prohibit malicious
attempts to produce the mischieff, of political revolution, by
rendering the established const tution odious to the society
which has adopted it. The .5tate and'Constitution being
the common inheritance, exl. ry attack, made upon them,
3

Chap. xxxiii, p. 637.
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which affects their permanence and security, is in a degree
an attack upon every individual and concerns the rights of
all. It is, therefore, a maxim of the law of England,
flowing by natural consequence and easy deduction from
the great principle of self-defence, to consider as libels or
misdemeanors every species of attack by writing or speaking,
the object of which is wantonly to defame that economy,
order, and constitution of things which make up the general
system of the law and government of the country."
In creating a government the "people of the United
States" must have intended to grant it such powers as were
necessary and proper to enable it to maintain its integrity,
and to secure itself against destruction. It is unreasonable
to charge them with a purpose to create a power which
should be without authority to resist a blow aimed at its own
existence. Had the power to "suppress insurrections" not
been incorporated into the express language of the Constitution, there would probably be no one.so hardy as to deny
that it would, ne-irtheless, have existed. The spectacle of
a nation pretending to an equality of rank with the great
nations of the globe, and stripped of all power to secure itself
against internal strife, would be, to say the least, an anomaly.
The fact that published attacks upon the government,
whether verbal or written, do not so closely affect the welfare
of society and the existence of the nation, does not affect
the principle involved. A national government cannot, it is
submitted, be deprived by implication of those powers which
are necessary to provide against direct or indirect attacks
upon its own existence.
An analogous principle is applied in reference to the
power of courts to punish for contempts committed against
them. Thus in U. S. v. Hudson & Goodwin,4 Mr. Justice
Johnson says: "Certain implied powers must necessarily
result from the nature of their [i. e. courts'] institution.
To fine for contempt-imprison for contumacyenforce the observance of order, etc., are powers which cannot be dispensed with in a.court, because they are necessary
to the exercise of all others; and so far our courts no doubt
47

Cranch,

-2.

at p. 34 (1812).
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possess powers not immediately derived froffi statute."5
As supporting the same general principle, we may refer to
the case of Anderson v. Dunn,8 where it was held that the
House of Representatives had inherent power to punish contempts committed in its presence, and that too, though the
Constitution expressly authorizes the punishment of members, but is silent as to such power over others. "That such
an assembly (as the House of Representatives)," says Mr.
Justice Johnson, "should not possess the power to suppress
rudeness or repel insult, is a supposition too wild to be
suggested."
Is it any more in accord with reason to suppose that the
Government of the United States does not have inherent
power to adopt such measures as are necessary and proper
to secure its own existence? We have been arguing from
the general principle that a government must be conceded
power to provide for self-preservation. This, we believe,
must be admitted even upon a strict construction of the Constitution. For certain powers are expressly granted to the
government; to exercise these it must exist, and, therefore,
it may pass laws which are "necessary and proper" to secure
its existence. In order to do this it must be able to provide
against such forces as tend to weaken by degrees the foundation as well as against such as tend to overthrow by violefice
the whole structure.
The exercise of power of this description has been upheld
as constituti6nal in the Chinese Exclusion cases, which, having been decided in comparatively recent years, may be
regarded as of undoubted authority. The facts of those
cases involved the right of the United States to exclude the
Chinese from its territory, and in upholding such right' the
Supreme Court does so, not by implying the power from
any particular express power, but on the ground that an
independent nation has power to take such measures as are
necessary for its own preservation. Thus, in Nishimura
Ekiu v. United States,7 the court says, speaking through
'V. also Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289 (i888) at p. 3o2 and cases there
cited; IV. BI. Comm., 286; State v. FreW, 24 W. Va. 416 (1884), etc.
'6 Wheaton, 204 (.182).

' 142 U. S. 651 (i8gr).
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Mr. Justice Gray: "It is an accepted maxim of international
law, that every sovereign nation has the power,- as inherent
in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservations to forbid
the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit
them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may
see-fit to prescribe." 9
We also find support for the implied right of the United
States to punish for offences aimed against its national
integrity in the implied right which exists to protect the lives
of its officers and insure them security in the exercise of their
official duties. Seditious libel may be directed against the
Constitution or the officers of government,10 and just as
the United States has the power to adopt such measures
as are necessary and proper for preserving the Constitution,
and for protecting the lives of its officers in order that they
may exercise their constitutional duties; so it is claimed,
it may adopt such measures as are necessary to guard against
seditious libel directed against them, which is a danger, less
apparent perhaps, but more insidious. The measures which
are necessary do not differ in respect to the principles which
authorize them, but only in the question of the remoteness
of their dangerous influence upon the body politic. The
same principle which establishes the propriety of federal
aLction to protect the life of a judge, authorizes such, action
to protect that judge from a wanton and contumelious attack
upon his office or upon his exercise of his official duties.
Similarly the right to punish for an attempt upon the life
of the President of the United States, or for the accomplished fact, includes the right to punish for a wanton and
malicious publication which incites to such a deed. That
the United States does have full power to protect its officers
in the exercise of their duties seems to us too clear to admit
of a doubt and we shall cite cases to sustain our contention.
'Italics our own.
'See also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698 (1892),
where the principles of this case are reiterated and emphasized. Also
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, i3o U. S. 581 (1888).
"V. Folkard's treatise, where the division is into such as are aimed
against (a) the Constitution; (b) the King; (c) the Government.
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How far the clause in the Constitution defining treason
ought to affect this general right will be discussed later.
In re Neagle n it will be remembered, a United States
marshal was arrested by a sheriff in the State of California
for the murder of one Terry. Terry had threatened violence
to MrJustice Field, and trouble being anticipated, the marshal, by direction of the Attorney-General of the United
States, accompanied Mr. Justice Field when- he went for
the purpose of performing his judicial duties to'the district
where Terry lived. No law of Congress authorized a marshal to be appointed for such purpose.. As was anticipated,
Terry attacked Mr. Justice Field, and Neagle, the marshal,
to protect him and also himself, shot and killed Terry. He
was taken into custody-by the state court, but on petition to
the United States Circuit Court and appeal to the Supreme
Court, he was discharged on the ground that he acted under
the authority of a law of the United States. Mr. Justice
Lamar, with whom concurs Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, dissents, on the ground that the "law" should have been an
act of Congress. But from the general principle upon which
the majority proceeds there is no dissent. That principle is
at one place' 2 thus expressed: "If a person in the situation
of Judge Field could have no other guarantee of his personal
safety, while engaged in the conscientious discharge .6f'his
duty, than the fact that if he was murdered his murderer
would be subject to the laws of a state and by those laws
could be ptinished, the security would be very inefficient.
We do not believe that the Government of the
United States is thus inefficient, or that its Constitution
and laws have left the high officers of the government so
defenceless and unproteted." This- establishes the right
of the government to protect the life of a justice of th(
Supreme Court in the discharge of his duties. This being so
it folloivs as a corollary that the government has the righ
to punish for the taking of that life, at least where this occur'
while the judge is exercising his official rights.1 3 This, i
135 U. S. 1 (889).

21
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seems, includes the right to protect a judge from such acts as
lead to violence. In this latter class is included one form of
seditious libels. The court in this case refers in passing
to the clear right of the United States to punish for interference with the United States mail. How much more should
power be properly and logically implied to preserve officers
of the government from harm.
In Logan v. United States 4 it was held to be an offence

punishable by the United States to injure and oppress citizens in a free exercise of a right secured to them by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Mr. Justice Gray
says, among other things: "The United States are bound to
protect against lawless violence all persons in their service or
custody in the course of the administration of justice."' 15
Surely this principle authorizes the United States to punish
for the murder of a judge of the United States or for an attempt to murder such judge while in the exercise of his
duties, for in such case he is in the exercise of a right secured
to him by the Constitution. The same principle authorizes
similar legislation for the protection of the lives of all federal
officials. The laws of the United States must be enforced
and since to such enforcement the action of men is necessary,
we can see no error in the decision which implies from the
Constitution the power in the general government to adopt
such measures as insure protection to these persons, upon
whom the duties of federal office have fallen.
Nor does it seem to be any stretch of construction to
extend this protection to federal officials, although at the
time when the crime is committed such official is not immediately engaged in the exercise of his prescribed duties. If
the purpose of the crime is to prevent his exercise of future
duties it is almost, if not quite, as serious as though the
official at the time the blow was struck had been immediately
treasurer, or the king's justices of the one bench or the other, justices in
eyre, or justices of assize, and all other justices assigned to hear and
determine, being in their places doing their officers": IV. Bl. Comm., 84.

V. infra.

144 U. S. 263 (i8gi).
"Cf. also Tennessee v. Davis, io U. S. 257 (1879) ; Ex parte Siebold,
100 U. S. 371 (1879).
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engaged in fulfilling some active duty of his office. Still
further, admitting that the purpose of the criminil is not to
strike at the official character of the man, but to gratify
some personal spite, yet, it seems to us, the result is the same
-the vigor of federal action is impaifed by the act done.
The United States has authority under the cases cited to
enact measures to secure*itself in full vigor of action, and
therefore, to punish such acts as interfere with its operation
within its sphere of action.
Before applying these principles immediately to the question of seditious libel, we wish to consider one objection
sometimes made against the doctrine we are advocating;
viz,. that the Constitution provides that: "Treason against
the United States shall consist only in levying war against
them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and
comfort.""' It is argued that at common law and under the
statute, 25 Edw. III., c. 2, it was high treason to "compass
or imagine the death of our lord the king,"'1 7 that by analogy
it must be treason to attempt or take the life of the President
or the United States, and that Congress cannot punish such
act merely by failing to call it treason.
Now in answer to this argument it may be said, in the
first place, that although the Constitution declares that .treason shall consist only in the enumerated offences, yet the
ConstiAution itself provides in another article"8 that Congress shall have power "to provide for the punishment of
counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United
States." This is conclusive of the fact that the-fiamers of
the Constitution did not intend the definition of treason to
prevent the punishment of other offences, merely because
they had been treason under the English law, for it will be
remembered that under the statute, already referred to, the
sixth species of treason is "if a man counterfeit the king's
mloney."' 19 We referred above to the case of In re Neagle,
in which the court proceeds on the principle that the United
"'
Article iii, § 3.
ZTIV

B. Comm., 76; I Hale's P. C.,

107;

23

Article i, § 8.

25 Edw. III., c. 2, IV. BI. Comm., 84.

Foster's Crown Law, 193.
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States has been granted the power to protect the federal
judges in the exercise of their judicial duties. Will it be
contended that to kill a federal judge, sitting in the discharge
of such duties would not be a crime punishable by that government whose laws he is enforcing? And yet such act
would have been treason under the statute of Edward 111.20
But a more conclusive answer, we believe, is found in the
following considerations. The section of the Constitution
defining treason occurs in the third article of the instrument.
It will be remembered that this is the article relating to the
judicial power. That this provision is intended to apply
more in particular to that branch of the government is
emphasized by the fact that the succeeding paragraph begins:
"The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment
of treason, etc." This definition of treason is addressed
immediately to the judiciary and prevents their deciding
that any act is treason except what is clearly defined by the
language of the section to be such. Indirectly; no doubt, it
does-affect the a&fon of Congress; for, should Congress pass
a law making some other offence treason, the judiciary under
this section would be bound to disregard it since they are
directed to treat as treason only the enumerated offences.
That this is the scope and purpose of this language clearly
appears when reference is had to the mischief sought to be
remedied. For the mischief was, according to Mr. Justice
Blackstone,2 1 that "by the antient [sic] common law, there
was a great latitude left in the breast of the judges2 2 to
determine what was treason, or not so: whereby the creatures of tyrannical princes had opportunity to create abundance of constructive treasons,22" that is, to raise, by forced
and arbitrary constructions, offences into the crime and
punishment of treason which never were suspected to be
such." The commentator cites an extreme example of this
to illustrate the arbitary construction of the judges: "Thus,"
he says, "the accroaching, or attempting to exercise, royal
Edw. III., c. 2, IV Bl. Comm., 84.
'IV BI. Comm., 75.
" Italics our own.
025
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power (a very uncertain charge) was, in the 21 Edw. III.,
held to be treason in a knight of Hertfordshire, who forcibly
assaulted and detained one of the king's subjects till he paid
him 9o 1.:24 a crime, it must be owned, well deserving of
punishment, but which seems to be of. a complexion very
different from that of treason."
Such was the arbitrary and tyrannical exercise of power
that the framers of the Constitution sotght to avoid. It
clearly explains the propriety of placing the restrictive definition of treason in the article treating of the judicial power
and not including it among the limitations upon congressional action, which are enumerated and collected in one
section, viz, Section 9 of Article I. That this is the proper
view to take of the provision appears further from what is
said in the Federalist25 tipon this subject: "As new-fangled
and artificial treasons have been the great engines by which
violent factions, the natural offspring of free governments,
have usually wreaked their alternate malignity on each
other, the Convention have, with great judgment, opposed
a barrier to this peculiar danger, by inserting a constitutional
'27
definition26 of the crime."

The question of how far. this definition of treason affects
federal action for the protection of government officials
applies to the subject we have under discussion in two ways;
first in respect to its effect upon the right of the national
governinent to protect the lives of its officers. We have
been contending that this right is ample and complete, in
order that we may use such established right for the purpose
of including within it laws punishing seditious libel as one
species of laws protecting government officials. Of course,
if the constitutional definition of treason should be held to
prevent legislation for the protection of the lives of the
officers of government our major premise would be
destroyed. In consequence of this; therefore, the importance
of meeting the argument drawn from the supposed restriction
21I Hale's P. C., 8o.
"No. xlii, p. 299.
'Italics our own.
'V.

to the same effect Story's Comm. on the Cons., vol. i, §

flf
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of the announced scope of treason, clearly appears. In the
second place, it will be remembered that there was great
question in the English law how far words and writings
might be held to amount in themselves to treason. For
though, in Pine's Case,208 after a review of the ancient cases
-uponthis subject, all the judges resolved "that unless it were
by some particular statute, no words shall be treason," yet
this seems not always to have been the law, 29 and with respect
to writings, "there was no manner of doubt but that the
publication of such a treasonable writing was a sufficient
overt act of treason at the common law ;3o though of late
'31
even that has been questioned.
It is, therefore, of great importance to show that the constitutional provision is not restrictive of the action of Congress in punishing this class of offences against the United
States, and we think the. considerations suggested above are
sufficient to support our contention that the section in question does not hinder such congressional action. It may be
noted in passing -that one act frequently possesses in itself
the elements of more than one crime. Thus, though the
killing of the king was treason at the English law, it was
at the same time murder. Treason in its very name (pro32
ditio) imports a betraying, treachery or breach of faith.
This was the reason which made it treason to kill the king;
for such crime constituted a breach of that allegiance which
every subject owed to the person of his sovereign-a per•sonal allegiance unknown under our democratic form of
government. But, granting that an act did include in itself
a breach of this faith, still if it hinders the smooth and proper
working of government, it contains in itself the elements of
two offences, and however much the Constitution may be
held to prohibit the punishment of an act the entire illegality
of which arises from its breach of that faith which should
exist between a citizen and the sovereignty, yet where an
act shows the second aspect, of impeding the due administraCro. Car.,

117.

Hale's P. C., 115.

"i

:0 Hale's P. C., 118, 38.
"IV
BI. Comm., 8i.
2
IV

B. Comm., 75.

THE JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES

12

tion of the law, it should, to this extent, be punishable. There
can be no ground, it seems to us, to claim that the government in so doing is punishing treason, and nullifying the
constitutional prohibition by a mere turn of words. The
substance of the act punished in the case supposed is no
more treason, though the same deed might justify a definition of the act as treason, than an indictment for th murder
of the King of England would be a prosecution for treason,
simply because the offence also contained in itself the element of treason.
It seems to us, therefore, that the cases deciding that the
United States has power to protect its officers in the discharge of their duties, stand unimpaired by the argument
abovie referred to. In co~xsequence of the same reasons, that
argument does not forbid the punishment of seditious libel.
If, therefore, we can show that the prevention of seditious
libel is necessary for the protection of the lives of the officers
of the national government, and for their security in the
exercise of their duties, we shall have shown that the cases
referred to are authorities for the proposition that the United
States has jurisdiction to punish for seditious libels of this
kind.
That such is true admits, we believe, of no doubt.. One
who, being absent at the time a crime was committed, fret
procure.d, counseled or commanded another to commit it,
was at the common law guilty of the crime as an accessory
before the faict,3s and in general suffered the same punishment as the principal.3 4 The guilt of such act was unquestioned, and the punishment meted out shows that the offence
was regarded close to the actual crime committed in degree
of guilt. Everyone knows that in high treason and misdemeanors no distinction whatever was drawn, but that all
were regarded as principals.3 5 Still furtlier the counseling
and inciting to crime are in themselves criminal though no
6rime is done in consequence thereof.38 * It is thus evident
33

Hale's P. C., 616.

"IV BI. Comm.,

3b; i Hale's P. C., 621.
P. C., 613; IV B1. Comm., 35.
"Reg. v. Gregory, io Cox Cr. Cas. 459 (1867).
Wi Hale's
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what intimate relations the law conceives to exist between
the spoken or written incitement to the criminal act and
the actual commission thereof.
It appears clear, therefore, that the power to protect the
officials of the government from injury must include, in
order to be complete and effective, the power to punish such
publications as.tend in a substantial measure to render their
positions unsafe or to impede them in the exercise of their
prescribed duties. As we have said before, the protection
differs not in kind but merely in degree, and to establish the
one establishes the other, unless, perhaps, an express limitation shall be found to exist in consequence of the first
amendment to the Constitution forbidding the making of
any law abridging the freedom of the press. This-is the
inquiry which we must pursue in the second part of this
paper, but before proceeding to that, it seems worth while
to summarize the results of the discussion to the present
point.
The power to punish, for seditious libel, it is submitted,
results to the United States, first from its inherent right to
adopt such measures as are necessary for its self-preservation, and, second from its right to adopt such measures as
are necessary to secure its officers in the due administration
of their duties. The definition in the Constitution of what
shall constitute treason does not affect this question: first,
because it was not intended to prevent the punishment of
all offences, which had at the common law or under English statutes been held to be treason; second, because its
peculiar purpose was to prevent the judiciary from enlarging the scope of treason by arbitrary construction, and in
the third place because the act punished is not treason, inasmuch as no breach of faith is punished, but the legislation
is aimed at interference with the operations of government.
It remains to consider whether the express limitations of
the Constitution confine the jurisdiction of the United States
over seditious libels, and, if so, within what limits.
It seems to be universally admitted that the amendment
which forbids Congress to pass any law abridging the freedom of the press renders unconstitutional all acts of Con-

14
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gress which might have for their object the establishment of
a censorship of ,the press.3 7 Admitting that the prohibition of such censorship is within the purview of the article,
the more difficult question arises whether this is the limit of
its effectiveness. It is well.known that it has never been held
40
39
38
to protect a personal libel, or a contempt, or blasphemy,
or other instances in which spoken or written w6rds had
been regarded by the common law as a civil wrong or a public misdemeanor by reason of their interference with individual rights. 41 But if it should be held that the amendment exhausts its force in prohibiting a censorship, it would
have to be admitted at once that rather narrow protection is
given to the citizen, since this construction would confer
upon the legislature the power to visit with severe punishments publications of the most innocent nature.
It is
exceedingly unlikely that this was the intent of the framers
of the Constitution, and Judge Cooley accordingly says: "It
seems more than probable that the constitutional freedom of
the press was intended to mean something more than mere
exemption from censorship in advance of publication. ' '
He then makes the argument that in the constitutional point
of view the press was the agency for bringing persons in
authority before the bar of public opinion to answer for any
misfeasance in office; that it was, in .particular, its freedom
for this purpose that was desired, and that "it is a just conclusion, therefore, that this freedom of discussion was meant
to be fully 'preserved; and that the prohibition of laws
impairing it was aimed, not merely at a censorship of the
Story on the Constitution, § 188o; i Tuck., Black. Comm., App. 297299; 2 Tuck., Black. Comm., App. II; 2 Kent's Comm., 17; Respliblica
v. Oswald, i Dallas, 349 (1788); Cooley's Principles of Constitutional
Law, 299; De Lolme,, Const. of England, chapter x; IV BI. Comm.,
151; Rawle on Const., chapter x; Com. v. Blonding, 3 Pick. 3o4, 313
(i825), etc.

'V. inter alia Barr v. Moore, 87 Pa. 385 (3§2)

(1878); Morton v.

State, 3 Tex. App. 317 (1878).

V. inter alia Respublic6 v. Oswald, i Dallas, 349 (1788).
Updegraph v. Com., ii S. & R 394 (1824).
e IV Bl. Comm. 15, enumerating various offences by the spoken or
written word.
' Cooley's Principles of Constitutional Law, 300.
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press, but more particularly at any restrictive laws or administration of law, whereby such free and general discussion
of public interests and affairs as had become customary in
America should be so abridged as to deprive it of its
advantages as an aid to the people in exercising intelligently
their, privileges as citizens, and in protecting their liberties."' 43 General language like this, when used in reference
to legal principles, must always exhibit the fault of indefiniteness, but in this instance it is important in two aspects: first,
as showing that in the mind of this learned writer the liberty
of the press guarantees the citizen more protection than freedom from censorship; and second, that this additional protection is peculiarly intended to be applicable in those cases
which we are examining, that is, where the citizen undertakes to examine the acts of government or of public officers.
It seems worth while to remember in this connection that
the phrase "liberty of the press," which has been so frequently and so eloquently descanted on by American orators,
is by no means a hfative product of American soil. Blackstone, whose commentaries were written more than a quarter
of a century before the adoption of this first amendment,
uses the phrase, and uses it in a manner which indicates
that even then it had become a familiar one.44 Every student
of the law remembers his forcible and eloquent exposition of
the meaning of the phrase, and the passage in which it was
discussed has been referred to by almost every case involving the principles there discussed. It must have been familiar
to those who framed this amendment, and when they use
the same phrase used by Blackstone and in no way qualify
it, except by adding to it the "liberty of speech," it seems a
natural inference that they use it in the same sense in which
it was used by him. Judge Cooley, notwithstanding what
he says above concerning the scope of the amendment, admits
that "in this country it [i. e., Mr. Justice Blackstone's view]
has been accepted as expressing the views of those who
framed and adopted this amendment. ' 45 And he cites in
Ibid., 3O. Cf. Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 441,
"IV BI. Comm., I51.
'Cooley's Principles of Constitutional Law, 300.

442.
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support of this, Rawle on Const., Chap. x, 2 'Kent, 17 ;4
Story on Const., § 1889; Coin. v, Blonding.6 Now Blackstone enumerates seditious libels among offences which are
punishable under the law, without a violation of that liberty
of the press, to which he gives his full and forcible endorsement. 4 7 It would follow then that the punishment of seditious libel was not intended by those who framed and
adopted this amendment to be considerea an infringement
of the liberty of the press ,and that such publications were
still subject to governmental animadversion.
In Respublica v. Dennie,48 a case occurring close enough
to the adoption of the amendment to exhibit judicial opinion of its scope, the defendant was indicted for a seditious
libdl. The indictment was found in the Mayor's Court in
Philadelphia, afnd removed, under the practice of that day,
into the Supreme Court, where the trial occurred before
Justices Yeates, Smith and Brackenridge. The alleged libel
consisted in an attack on democratic government. In his
charge to the jury Justice Yeates finds it necessary to draw
the line between what is and what is not protected by the
constitutional guarantees. A number of the passages in
his charge are sufficiently significant to be quoted: "Publish
as you please in the first instance without control; but you
are answerable both to the community and the individual if
you proceed to unwarrantable lengths." "There is a marked
and evident distinction between such publications [as are for
public information], and those which are plainly accompanied with a criminal intent, deliberately designed to unloosen the social band of union, totally to unhinge the minds
of citizens, and to produce popular discontent with the
exercise of power, by the known censtituted authorities.
..
'The liberty of the press consists in publishing the

The passage in Kent is in substance a fair equivalent (nothing
more) of Mr. Justice Blackstone's statement. It is adopted by the
'Editors of the American and English Encyclopaedia of Law (N. S.),
vol. vi, p. Ioo2. It tends to show that Blackstone's statement has by
no means been outgrown in the developmeoat of civil and political
liberty.
ft 3 Pick. 304, 313 (825).
"IV BI. Comm., I5I.
I4 Yeates, 267 (1805).
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truth, from good motives and for justifiable ends, though
it reflects on government or on magistrates.' "" "If the
consciences of the jury shall be clearly satisfied that the publication was seditiously, maliciously and wilfully aimed at
the independence of the United States, the constitution
thereof of, or of this state, they should convict the defendant. If, on the other hand, the production was honestly
meant to inform the public mind, and warn them against
supposed dangers in society, though the subject may have
been treated erroneously

.

.

.

.

they should acquit the

defendant." This case is too clear to be misunderstood.
The liberty of the press does not prevent the punishment of
seditious libels, and we are given several very tangible criteria as aids in determining whether or not the libel in question is of a seditious character. It will be important to
remember these principles at a later stage of the discussion.
Our main purpose in citing the case at this point is to show
that though the constitutional guarantee may demand greater
strictness in definiiig the scope of seditious libel than would
exist in its absence, it does not divest that offence of guilt or
of punishable character. This decision was, of course, made
under the Constitution of Pennsylvania, but the provision
of that instrument in this respect is in no way narrower than
that of the Federal Constitution.
It would be more satisfactory if we were able to cite deci-.
sions of the Federal Supreme Court to enforce this position,
but unfortunately, no decision has been made by that tribunal
upon the point. It will be remembered, however, that in
1798 the so-called Sedition Act was passed by Congress,
and that its constitutionality was seriously doubted by a large
part of the people. Its impolicy is, of course, a subject
wholly foreign to the purpose of this paper and gives rise
to a question which we do not intend to enter upon. The
only aspect that concerns us in this discussion is its constitutionality. It expired by virtue of its own limitation
in 18o and was never passed on by the United States
Supreme Court, so that we have no authoritative decision as
to the legality of its enactment by Congress. But, as is well
"Quoting from General Hamilton in Crosswell's Trial, pp. 63, 64.
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=ough known, it gave rise to almost unlimited discussion,
and arguments in regard to its ccnstitutionality 'are by no
means few. 'It is our purpose to consider some of the more
important of these, since the criticisms of this act form the
closest precedents we have. in our count#y's history, bearing
upon the question how far the jurisdiction of the United
States over seditious libel' is limited.
The language of this act5" was in substance as follows:
"If any person shall write, print, utter or publish,....
any false, scandalous, and malicious writing or writings
against the government of the United States, or either House
of the Congress of the United States, or the President of
the.United States, with intent to defame the said government, or either house of the said Congress, or the said President, or to bring them, or either of them into contempt or
disrepute; or to excite against them, or either of them the
hatred of the good people of the United States, or to stir
up.sedition within the United States, or to excite any unlawful combinations therein for opposing or resisting any law
of the United States or any act of the President of the United
States, done in pursuance of any such law, or of the powers
in him vested by the Constitution of the United States, or
to resist, oppose, or defeat any such law or act, or to aid,
encourage, or abet any hostile designs of any foreign nation
against the United States, their people or government, then
such person,. etc.," shall on being convicted be punished, etc.
It is of importance to notice at once that the scope of this
act is so broad that it covers not alone publications, the purpose of which is to stir up sedition, etc., but even those whose
only purpose is to defame. In considering, therefore,. the
opinions which have been passed on this act, where the exact
part of the act objected to is not named, it is important to
remember that one who approves the act, admits the power
.of Congress to punish for every species of libel named in it,
while one who condemns it, may do so not on the ground
that all of its provisions are unconstitutional but that some
are, and that with these the rest must fall. It is*believed
that it was the fact that the act went too far in certain of its
provisions that decided the attitude of numerous persons
"Act of July 14, 1798.
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towards the act as a whole. Undoubtedly there were prosecutions sustained under it which would now be regarded as
oppressive and inconsistent with the liberty of the press, but
this is not conclusive of the question whether an act which
was confined in its scope to a narrower and more dangerous
class of cases would not meet with general approval so far as
its constitutional aspect is concernedi-the question of its
policy entirely aside.
Remembering this we turn to examine briefly the support
or attack which the act received from various sources which
seem worthy of consideration. In the first place, prosecutions in Circuit Courts of the United States were sustained
under it. We may refer to the Trial of Matthew Lyon,Boa
in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Vermont
District before Paterson, J., circuit judge, and Hitchcock, J.,
district judge: Trial of Thomas Cooper,50b in the Circuit Court
of the United States for the Pennsylvania District before
Chase, J. (in this case the act is distinctly approved . ' Trial
of Jates.Thompson Callenderw in the Circuit Court of the
United States for the Virginia district, also before Chase, J. :5
Trial of Anthony Haswell,"", in the Circuit Court of the United
States for the Vermont District before Paterson, J. We have,
therefore, the decision of three federal judges in favor of
the constitutionality of the measure. It is impossible for
us, even if it were desirable, to consider and discuss in this
paper the facts of these various cases. It is sufficient to say.
that the publications upon which indictments were sustained,
were, in at least two of the cases, of a character which at
present would be regarded as far from endangering the peace
t'a Wharton's State Trials, 333 (1798).
'b Ibid., 659 (i8oo).
'c P. 67o.

dIbid., 688 (8oo).

" 1It will be remembered that it was the conduct of Judge Chase on
this trial that formed one of the principal complaints against him
when he was afterwards tried by the United States Senate upon
articles of impeachment. Eighteen Senators voted that he was guilty
of "rude, contemptuous and indecent conduct during the trial." Sixteen
voted otherwise. This, of course, was not a two-thirds majority and
hence failed to convict. It was not, however, for executing the act
that he was tried. V. Chase's Trial; Bullitt on the Constitution, p. 317.
la lbid., 684 (i8oo).
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and good order of the government. It is irpportant to
remember, however, the difficulties which then confronted a
new and untried form of government and to reflect that what
at present seems sufficiently mild and harmless might under
those circumstances, with some show of reason, be regarded
as dangerous and flagitious. It is to be noted, however, that
the prosecutions were sustained by these'judges even where
the publication was of this milder nature, showing that the
judges would have been still more ready to uphold an act
punishing publications more openly and wantonly seditious.
As illustrative of the same attitude towards the Sedition
Act we may refer to Addison's Charge to the Grand Jury
on the "Liberty of Speech and of the Press. '52 In this discussion the constitutionality of the act is directly considered
and upheld, the judge regarding the act as declaratory of
the common law. Blackstone's exposition of the liberty of
the press is quoted at length and fully endorsed as a proper
interpretation of the phrase and indicative of the scope intended to be given to the constitutional amendment.53
On the other hand it is well known that the Sedition Act
gave rise to a storm of disapproval. How much of this was
directed against the policy of the act and how much against
the constitutionality of it, it is impossible to decide. ,It is
well known that Jefferson, whose administration succeeded
that in which the act was passed, thoroughly disbelieved in
its constitutionality.5 But more important than the attitude
of Jefferson, perhaps, are the expressions of dissatisfaction
that came from the States of Virginia and Kentucky embodied in the famous "Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions."
The Virginia resolutions5 5 in unqualified language denounce
the act' as unconstitutional, both on the ground that it is an
exercise of a power nowhere delegated and on the ground
"Addison's Pennsylvania Reports, App. 27o,
" V. also in support of the constitutionality of the measure the
"Report of a Committee of Congress on the Alien and Sedition Laws,"
on the twenty-fifth of February, i799.
Letter to Stephens Thompson Mason (October 11, 1798), Writings
of Jefferson (edited by Ford), vol. vii, 283; letter to John Taylor
(November 26, 1798), ibid., 311.
'Virginia Resolutions of 1798: IV Elliot's Deb., 528.
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that it transgresses the limitations secured by the first
amendment. In answer to these resolutions, the Legislature
of Massachusetts explicitly declared its belief in the constitutionality of the measure and supported this view by an
answer to both objections urged by Virginia.5 6 In agree-7
ment with this view are the resolutions of New York,
Connecticut," 5 New Hampshire5 9 and Rhode Island.60 Delaware6 1 and Vermont 62 answered the resolutions by pronouncing them an unjustifiable interference with the general
government and authorities of the United States.
The Kentucky resolutions, passed on November io, 1798,
and the supplementary resolutions of November 14, 1799,63
still more emphatic than the Virginia resolutions in decrying the act, lose much of their force when we remember that
it was in these famous resolutions that the passage occurred:
"Resolved, That

.

.

.

the several states who formed

that instrument [the Constitution] being sovereign and independent, have the unquestionable right to judge of the infraction; and that a nullification by these sovereignties, of all
unauthorized acts done under color of that instrument, is
the rightful remedy" Every one knows what has become of
the doctrine of nullification. It is unfortunate for the
strength of the argument directed against the Sedition Act,.
that it should have occurred in such connection, for whatever might independently be said of the considerations for
and against its constitutionality, when they occur in conjunction with this doctrine, it is impossible not to believe that
the same views of the Federal Government, which induced
the claim of the right on the part of the state to nullify its
acts,were the principal grounds upon which the Sedition
Act wvas regarded as unjustifiable. Even the Virginia reso"Resolutions of Massachusetts, February 9, i799,'IV Elliot's Deb.,
533.
Ibid., 537.

Ibid., 538.
"'Ibid., 539.
'Ibid., 533.
'Ibid., 532.

'Ibid., 539.
"Ibid., 540 and 544.
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lutions, though couched in more temperate language, give
countenance to this exploded doctrine. It must,, therefore,
be remembered in considering these resolutions adverse to
the constitutionality of the act that the theory of the general
government, from which they are developed, is a theory
tainted with error. But even granted to them their full
weight as the expressions of the views of two states, the
answers made by the legislatures of the 6ther states would
lead to the conclusion that the prevailing view at the time
was in favor of the constitutionality. Nor is it any answer
to this to suggest the later history of the Federalists as indicative of the attitude of the majority towards the constitutionality of the measure. Such history is satisfactorily
explained on the ground that the policy of the act, not its constitutionality, *as condemned.
Later writers on constitutional law have not been clear in
expressing their opinions on the validity of the act. Mr.
Justice Story expressly declines to commit himself.64 Mr.
Justice Cooley in a note to Story's Commentaries says: "It
[the act] was far from being as questionable in point of
constitutional authority as some other acts which have been
adopted from a supposed necessity, and enforced almost
without objection in troublous times."6 5 On the other hand
Von Holst in his work on the "Constitutional History ofithe
United States" says :66 "Suffice it to say, that, for a long
time, they [i. e., the Alien and Sedition Laws] have been
considered in the United States as unquestionably unconstitutional." For this broad statement he cites no authority
whatever.
From the views upon the Sedition Act to which we have
made reference it appears that contemporary exposition
was far from being unanimous against its constitutionality.
In fact, the majority of the states acknowledge the authority
of Congress to pass the act. It is uniformly upheld when
prosecutions under it are attempted, and.we have no judicial
decision against its constitutionality. Later writers on the
-1

"Commentaries on the Constitution, § i8gi. Cf. § 1294.
Vol. ii, p. i8i.
"s Vol. i, P. 142.
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Constitution have not been unanimous in condemning it on
this ground, Mr. Von Holst's opinion to the contrary notwithstanding 6 7 While, therefore, it may be impossible to
come to a definite conclusion as to the validity of the act, it
seems to be clear that there are considerations in favor of
its constitutionality which render the decision a very close
one,* and which might be sufficient to make a case comparatively clear should it arise during a time so trying as that
in which the Sedition Act was passed.
.Laying aside, therefore, entirely the question as to the
policy of the act it seems to us that whatever constitutional
grounds exist for attacking it, arise not because it is an act
to punish sedition, and not within the delegated powers of
Congress, but because the act is too broad, and includes publications which under modern conditions are not seditious,
publications which do not- endanger the life of the state, or
impede the officers of the government in the exercise of their
duty. The application of the act to publications of a more
or less innocent character was, we believe, the great reason
for arousing enmity to it, and for causing inventive against
the principles which supported it. That it may have transcended by its terms the power vested in Congress, in that
it included in its scope publications not strictly seditious,
we do not hesitate to admit; at the same time we just as
unhesitatingly contend that the guarantee that the liberty
of the press shall not be abridged cannot be said to be shown'
by the comments and criticisms on the Sedition Act to allow
violent and wanton attacks on government for the purpose
of stirring up resistance to its authority, and bringing about
its ultimate overthrow.
The fair objection to the Sedition Act, we believe, is that
it failed to draw the line between such publications as vitally
affected the security and vigor of the government and such
as did not. The English Constitution boasts with that of
America, a "liberty of the press," and yet it does not hesitate
V. also the general language in Z'yard on the Constitution, r47
(1834) ; Flander's Constitution, §-4 : If. (1885) ; Rawle on the Constitution, 123 (1829). Tucker on lhe Constitution, vol. ii, p. 669 (1899)

will be found in support of Mr. Von Hoist's view, and also Bullitt on
the Constitution, 3,7 (1899).
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to admit that publications may materially and seriously
affect the government and its officers, and that-these are
proper subjects for punishment. In doing so it in no sense
admits that it is abridging the liberty of the press, but always
contends that it is bridling. its licentiousness. This distinction, so clearly drawn by Mr. Justice Blackstone, has been
adopted without question by American courts in other classes
of illegal publications. Why should they hesitate to apply
it in distinguishing from a constitutional point of iew, what
does and what does not infringe that liberty?
The form of government of the United States contains in
itself the means of changing either its policy or its structure
by constitutional measures. The advocate of such changes
who urges the exercise of constitutional rights for dislodging the party in power or for amending the Constitution
can, with perfect propriety, we think, claim that he is within
the protection of the constitutional amendment. It is when
he passes this line and urges illegal and unconstitutional
measures to replace the governing party or to overthrow the
form of government, that there arises an abuse of that liberty
of speech and of the press, which is intended to be secured to
the people. This it seems to us furnishes a distinction in a
sense fundamental. It will always remain to consider
whether the publication in question has so far passed the
line referred to as to endanger the security or efficiency of
the Federal Government.
To be surt this may not be an easy line to draw. But is
it more difficult than the line which is constantly required
to be drawn between fair comment and libellous writings?
The function of the jury must necessarily be considered and
it might be left to them to say whether a publication does
pass beyond the line of what is justified, while to the judge
it remains to tell them whether the publication is of such
a character that it may be so construed.
The distinctions drawn by Folkard in his treatise on Libel
and Slander in the chapter6 8 to which we have referred several times in the bpening of this paper show how the -English- courts have worked out the question as to where is the
"Chapter xxxiii, p. 637.
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proper place to make the distinction. We have already
referred to the principles laid down by Justice Yeates in
Respublica v. Dennie, and the distinctions there drawn,--distinctions fairly definite in form when we consider the nature
of the subject-matter to which they must be applied. Particularly worthy of reference again is the quotation there
made from General Hamilton in Crosswell's Trial: "The
liberty of the press consists in publishing the truth, from
good motives and for justifiable ends, though it reflects on
government or on magistrates." This gives us a boundary
line within which the guarantee of the Constitution is still
operative, and thus satisfies the views of those writers who
think that the language of the amendment should not be
narrowed to a mere prohibition of governmental censorship.
To sum up in brief the conclusions at which we have been
able to arrive in this second part of the discussion: we find
ground to believe that the.language of the first amendment
securing the liberty of the press, was used in the sense in
which it was understood under the English system of government, and was not intended to prohibit action on the part
of Congress against the licentiousness of the press, when
such licentiousness affected in a material and serious way
the security of the government or the effectiveness of its
action. The Sedition Act of 1798 forms the closest precedent in our history in deciding the questions which arise
in determining the scope of the liberty of the press; but inasmuch as the constitutionality of that act was never passed
on by the Supreme Court of the United States, we have no
authoritative declaration of its validity. If it passed beyond
the bounds of what was authorized by the Constitution, it
would seem to have done so, not so much because a measure
of this nature is not within the implied powers of Congress,
as because the act included in its denunciation publications
which would not now be regarded as affecting the safety or
efficiency of government, and, therefore, not seditious. To
draw the line between wiiat does impair the vigor of governmental action and threaten its existence, and what does not,
and hence to decide what is without and what within the
liberty of the press is the really difficult problem, but not
more so, apparently, than the solution of similar questions
in allied cases of libel.
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Judges may differ as to where this line should be drawn;
patriotic and intelligent men may differ as to whether it is
politic for Congress to enact such legislation at all, and may
point to the decline and fall of the party that passed the
Sedition Act as a lesson of history: but if such legislation
is passed the line between what does and what does not
seriously affect the stability and efficiency of government is,
-we believe, when correctly drawn, the line which separates
what is a constitutional restriction from what is not. The
power of the United States, as we have sought to show,
.results from its power to maintain its own integrity and
establish its own efficiency. Seditious libels we have sought
to show are such as threaten to impair that integrity and
destroy that efficiency. Over such libels, therefore, the
jurisdiction of the United States must be held to exist in
order that the true balance between the liberty and licentiousness of the press may be maintained within the jurisdiction
of the nation, as well as within that of the state.

Henry Wolf Bikle.

